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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF 
AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED 
SCIENCE, a Utah body 
politic and corporate, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 




PHILLIP A. BULLEN, et al. 
Third-Party 
Defendants-Respondents, 
Case No. 16274 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
BOSWORTH, SULLIVAN AND COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced by Utah State University (here-
inafter the "University") to recover monies from defendant 
Bosworth, Sullivan and Company (hereinafter "Bosworth"), a 
securities brokerage house, for losses allegedly sustained 
by the University arising out of securities bought and sold 
on behalf of the University by Bosworth. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Bosworth filed third-party claims of indemnity and con-
tribution against University officials who authorized the 
University's purchase and sale of securities. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On March 18, 1977, the Court entered an Order denying 
Bosworth's Motion for Change of Venue from the First Judicial 
District Court of Cache County. (R. 189). 
On July 22, 1977, the Court denied Bosworth's Motion 
to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. 
On March 21, 1978 and on May 1, 1978, the Court granted 
Third-Party Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, and on January 
3, 1979, the Court granted the University's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of liability. (R. 
771, 870, 999). 
Bosworth here appeals from the Orders listed above. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Bosworth seeks reversal of the Order denying Bosworth's 
Motion to Dismiss the University's First Amended Complaint. 
In the alternative, Bosworth seeks reversal of (1) the Order 
granting the University's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
(2) the Order dismissing Bosworth's Third-Party Complaint, 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In mid-1970, the University began a program of investing 
part of its funds in securities. This was accomplished, in 
part, through the use of various stock brokerage houses, one 
of which was Bosworth. The investment program was prompted 
primarily by (1) criticism by the State Auditor's office in 
1970 directed at the University for leaving large amounts of 
funds in non-interest-bearing bank accounts (Catron 44) and 
(2) a two percent cut in the University's budget in the 
summer of 1970. (Deposition Ex. 4). 
The University's investment program was expressly 
adopted and authorized by the University's Institutional 
Council (Deposition Exs. 7, 8, 9 and 33). 
Donald A. Catron, the University's Controller since 
April, 1970, was given unlimited control over the investment 
program. During the period from mid-1970 to March, 1973, 
Catron caused the University, through various broker-agents, 
including Bosworth, to buy and sell hundreds of securities 
involving millions of the University's dollars. 
Shortly after the investment program was implemented, 
Catron and others from the University attended an investment 
seminar in San Francisco sponsored by the Ford Foundation on 
the subject of securities investments by universities. 
(Deposition Ex. 17). 
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Rex A. Plowman, a member of the University's Institutional 
Council and the then newly formed investment committee and 
also one of those attending the Ford Foundation seminar, gave 
an oral report of the seminar to the entire Institutional 
Council on February 23, 1971. (Deposition Ex. 96). 
Three of the themes advanced by the Ford Foundation at 
the seminar influenced and became a part of the University's 
investment program. One theme was that in the past those 
who managed portfolios of educational institutions had lost 
more money, because of inflation, by being conservative 
in securities investments than by being agressive, and that 
portfolio managers should move from fixed income securities 
to equity securities, i.e., to stocks. In particular, the 
Ford Foundation report stated that, following World War II,: 
Far-sighted investors began to regard good 
common stocks as a better haven than bonds for 
funds seeking protection of purchasing power 
without material sacrifice of liquidity .... 
We conclude that, whatever may happen in the 
future, endowment managers should free themselves 
of rigid rules on the holding of bonds. (Depo-
sition Ex. 96 at 16). 
The Ford Foundation report also recommended that insti-
tutions not be restricted to "conventional blue chips" in 
common stock investments. (Deposition Ex. 96). 
A third theme of the Ford Foundation report was 
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should be delegated to a single manager with regular review 
by the institution's trustees. (Broadbent 100). 
On January 20, 1972, the Institutional Council held a 
regular meeting with 18 high-ranking members of the Univer-
sity present. A motion was made, seconded and passed ap-
proving a corporate resolution authorizing Dee A. Broadbent, 
University Vice President, and Catron "to purchase, trade, 
and sell, long or short, transfer and assign, stocks, bonds 
and securities of every nature on margin or otherwise". By 
its terms, the resolution was to "remain in full force and 
effect until written notice of revocation hereof shall be 
delivered to the brokers". (Deposition Ex. 33). 
At that meeting, there was absolutely no mention by 
anyone present about whether the University had the legal 
power to enter into such a resolution. The resolution was 
approved without a dissenting vote. 
In February, 1972, Catron, pursuant to the resolution, 
opened an account on behalf of the University with Bosworth 
by signing a customer account card. Prior to, or at the 
time the account was opened, Bosworth asked for and received 
from the University a copy of the resolution of the Institu-
tional Council authorizing Catron to purchase common stock. 
(R. 919). 
Bosworth relied upon the resolution which was certified 
by the Secretary of the Institutional Council, L. Mark 
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Neuberger. Without the resolution, Bosworth would not have 
dealt with Catron or anyone else on behalf of the University. 
(R. 920). 
After February, 1972, Bosworth executed trades at the 
request and on behalf of the University, the first taking 
place on February 1, 1972. Many of the trades occurred 
after December, 1972, the last trade occurring on March 7, 
1973. In each instance, Bosworth acted as an agent of the 
University, rather than as a principal. (R. 921). 
In the spring of 1972, until Catron was suspended in 
March, 1973, the Institutional Council, the Board of Regents 
and the University Administration received monthly reports 
of investments purchased, and the amount of the entire 
investment portfolio. (Catron 146; Neuberger 15). 
Throughout 1972, the Institutional Council gave whole-
hearted support and assistance to Catron. The minutes of the 
Institutional Council reflect that on February 15, 1972, 
Catron gave a report of the investment program and all 
present agreed that the project was being handled in a very 
satisfactory manner. (Deposition Ex. 85c). 
The minutes of a June 23, 1972, Institutional Council 
meeting reflect that at a meeting of the Investment Commit-
tee the evening before, Catron had demonstrated the use of a 
ticker tape which had been installed in his office. Mr. J. 
D. Harris, a member of both the Institutional Council and 
-6-
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the Investment Committee, reported in that meeting that he 
was more convinced than ever that the University was moving 
in the right direction. (Deposition Ex. 41 and 42). 
On July 29, 1972, Harris reported to the Institutional 
Council that the Investment Committee had received a report 
of the earnings on investments for the past year and ex-
pressed the feeling that the investment staff was doing a 
remarkable job. (Deposition Ex. 44). 
Not until December, 1972, did anyone at the University 
question the legality or validity of the University's 
investment program. In late 1972, an audit of the Univer-
sity was begun by the private accounting firm of Ernst & 
Ernst. The acocunting firm questioned the validity of 
investments being made by the University and sought an 
opinion from the Utah Attorney General's office. (Broad-
bent 260-261). 
During this period of time, Catron continued to purchase 
securities through Bosworth. (R. 77). 
On January 10, 1973, the Instutitional Council reviewed 
a letter written by Mr. H. Wright Volker, Assistant Attorney 
General, to Mr. Sherman J. Preece, State Auditor, which 
questioned the validity and legality of the University's 
investments. However, investments continued to be made 
through Bosworth by Catron. No one from the Institutional 
-7-
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Council, the President's office, or the Attorney General's 
office notified Bosworth of the questions raised as to the 
legality of the investment program. 
Catron was fired in March, 1973. The officers of the 
University and members of the Institutional Council were not 
clear as to what instructions Catron had been given from 
December, 1972, to March, 1973. Some of the members and 
officers believed Catron was given instructions to follow 
the "prudent man" rule in liquidating stocks while others 
thought that he had been instructed to stop purchasing 
stocks. (Broadbent 203). Bosworth was informed for the 
first time on March 20, 1973, that Catron's authority on 
behalf of the University had been withdrawn. (Deposition 
Ex. 63). 
Mr. Catron testified in his deposition that no one 
instructed him not to purchase common stocks after December, 
1972, even though the University had received Mr. Volker's 
opinion. 
Q. Was it your understanding prior to March 1, 
1973, that during the period December, 1972, 
to March 1, 1973, that you were not to pur-
chage common stocks for the investment port-
folio of Utah State University out of public 
monies? 
A. What were those dates again? 
Q. December 1, 1972, to March 1, 1973. 
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A. No. 
Q. That was not your understanding? 
A. Yes. That was not my understanding. 
Q. And to make sure that it's clear, you have 
no recollection of ever receiving such in-
structions either from Mr. Broadbent or 
President Taggart or any member of the 
Institutional Council in that regard? 
A. No. (Catron 217-218). 
On January 10, 1973, Broadbent informed the Institution-
al Council that funds invested as of June 30, 1972 had come 
from the unrestricted general account, the auxillary fund, 
development funds, loan funds, endowment funds, plant funds, 




THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING BOSWORTH'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN GRANTING THE UNI-
VERSITY'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. The Allegations Of The University's First 
Amended Complaint Fail To State A Claim 
Against Bosworth Upon Which Relief Can Be 
Granted. 
Assuming arguendo that the security transactions at 
issue were ultra vires or illegal, the University's First 
Amended Complaint nevertheless fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. 
-9-
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Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint alleges merely that 
(1) Catron was the University's Investment Officer; (2) at 
the request of Catron, Bosworth executed securities orders 
for the University; (3) the only monies available to Catron 
for payment were in the custody and/or possession of the 
University; (4) said payments were ultra vires. The Univer-
sity alleges no wrongdoing against Bosworth. 
Where parties to an illegal or ultra vires contract 
are in pari delicto the courts will refuse to enforce rights 
arising therefrom, not only where the contract is executory, 
but also when the agreement has been executed. Restatement 
of Contract, §598 (1932). 
Even if Bosworth is charged with knowledge that the 
University's securities purchases were illegal or ultra 
vires, the University would be in pari delicto because it 
similarly would be charged with such knowledge. Indeed, 
the University should have the greater responsibility to 
know the legal limits of its own actions. This being so, 
the court should leave the parties where it finds them and 
deny the University rescission of the executed transactions. 
This result would conform to the law regarding illegal 
contracts and would be consistent with the Utah Supreme 
Court decision in First Equity Corporation of Florida v. 
Utah State University, 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975). In First 
-10-
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Equity, a broker sued the University to recover monies for 
securities ordered but not paid for. Because the trans-
actions were executory and because the court found the 
securities transactions to be ultra vires and illegal, the 
Court denied the relief prayed for. 
The court in First Equity stated: "Utah State Univer-
sity had no power to enter into an agreement for the purchase 
of common stock and the agreement to purchase and pay commis-
sions thereon are ultra vires agreements and unenforceable". 
544 P.2d at 893 (emphasis added). The court specifically 
held the ultra vires contracts were unenforceable. The 
ruling is far different than the University's position 
asserted here that ultra vires contracts may be unwound in 
favor of the University to the severe detriment of the 
University's broker-agent. 
This result would also conform with the ruling of the 
United States Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit where this 
action and other similar actions were taken on appeal 
after having been originally brought in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, 
raising federal claims along with the state claims now 
presented. On January 24, 1977, the Tenth Circuit unani-
mously ruled that the University's theory of recovery was 
untenable. 
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The argument that the brokers are liable because 
they should have known that the stock purchases 
by u.s.u. were illegal under Utah law does not 
impress us. U.S.U. seeks to take advantage of 
its own wrongful acts. It would retain the 
profits which it has made and recover from the 
brokers the losses which it has sustained. An 
ultra vires act of an institutional customer 
may no~converted into a wrongful act of the 
broker. Utah State University v. Bear, Stearns 
& Co., 549 F.2d 164, 168 (1977). 
The law of Utah is the same. In Moe v. Millard County 
School District, 54 Utah 144, 179 P. 980 (1919), a contractor 
entered into a contract with the Millard County School Dis-
trict to supply fixtures for a school building. The contract 
was declared void because it exceeded the constitutional 
debt limit. While recognizing that the contractor cannot 
recover money owing on an ultra vires contract, the Court 
also held the contractor would not be required to refund any 
of the purchase price previously paid by the school district. 
The Court stated: 
We cannot perceive the necessity of refunding 
the money that was paid as aforesaid. To that 
extent the contract has been executed and there 
certainly is no good reason why in equity that 
matter should be reopened. Nor is it necessary to 
do that in order to reflect justice between the 
parties. If there were but one article that had 
been sold, or the articles were so united that 
they would have to be treated as an entirety, 
then, in order to reflect full justice, if plain-
tiff were given the right to remove and to re-
possess himself of all he had sold, he should 
also be required to refund what he had received. 
In this case, however, there are many articles 
some of which can be removed while others cannot. 
Again, as already stated, a part of the purchase 
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price has been paid and received, and to that 
extent the matter, in equity at least, should 
be treated as closed. 54 Utah at 151, 179 P. at 
983. 
In the present case, the University alleges that its 
payments to Bosworth were made either ultra vires or under a 
mistake of law. As shown by the Utah Supreme Court in Moe, 
the University may not recover regardless of its own or its 
agent's mistake. 
In a later decision by this Court involving a contract 
between the same school district as in Moe and another corpora-
tion, the court again left the parties where it found them: 
When an ultra vires contract with a corporation 
has been fully performed on both sides, neither 
party can maintain an action to set aside the 
transaction or to recover what has been parted 
with. In other words, neither a Court of Law 
nor a Court of Equity will interfere with such 
a case to deprive either the corporation or 
the other party of mo'ney or property acquired 
under the contract. Millard County School Dis-
trict v. State Bank of Millard County, 80 Utah 
170, 14 P.2d 967, 972 (1932)(quoting 3 Fletcher, 
Cyc. Corpns. §1559, p. 2631) (emphasis added). 
The University received precisely what it bargained 
for. The transactions are closed and equity requires that 
they remain so. The University should not be allowed to 
take advantage of its own wrongful acts. The fact that the 
University is a public institution expending public monies 
does not change the law. Moe and Millard County School Dis-
trict both involved a public school district. 
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Furthermore, the University's alternative theory of 
recovery, i.e., that the payments in question were made under 
a mistake of law, is unsupported and unsupportable in this 
case. The law is well settled that payments under a mistake 
of law may not be recovered. Restatement of the Law of Resti-
tution, §45; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Dodge County Commissioners, 
98 U.S. 541 (1879); Olympic Steamship Co. v. United States, 
165 F.Supp. 627 (D.C. Wash. 1958). 
B. Bosworth Acted Only As The University's 
Agent. 
With respect to the University's investment program, 
Bosworth functioned solely as an agent for the University. 
Bosworth neither purchased securities from the University 
nor sold securities to the University. Bosworth received 
nominal commissions for its services as a broker. The 
University's allegedly ultra vires purchases and sales of 
securities were entered into with third party sellers and 
buyers, and in no respect with Bosworth. 
Even if the University were entitled to damages for 
losses, if any, sustained in connection with its investment 
program, liability would rest with those who bought from and 
sold to the University. There exists no conceivable theory 
upon which such liability could lie against the broker-agent. 
An agent is not liable on a contract executed by him on 
behalf of another. Restatement (Second) of Agency, §320 at 
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67 (1958); Fink v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 421 P.2d 735 
(Colo. 1966); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Turner 
Insurance Agency, Inc., 535 P.2d 664 (Idaho 1975); and 
Seigworth v. State, 539 P.2d 464 (Nev. 1975). 
In Unger v. Travel Arrangements, Inc., 266 N.Y. Supp. 
2d 715, 721 (1966), a customer sued a travel agency to 
recover the amount paid for a trip later cancelled by a 
steamship company which had become insolvent. Because the 
travel agency had passed the customer's money on to the 
steamship company the Court held the most the plaintiff 
could recover was any commission retained by the travel 
agency. 
The reasoning of the Unger case is applicable here. If 
the University may obtain relief from Bosworth, such relief 
must be limited to the amounts retained by Bosworth in the 
form of commissions. And under this court's holding in First 
Equity, supra, the University's claims are completely barred. 
Pursuant to that case, if the University's stock transactions 
through Bosworth were ultra vires then the agreement may not 
be enforced by either side. Dicta in First Equity suggesting 
that a stock broker for the University, even through an agent 
rather than a principal, is nonetheless estopped from enforc-
ing an ultra vires contract does not apply to the present 
case because here the broker is not attempting to enforce 
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the agreement. As previously mentioned herein, First Equity 
does not hold that the University may unwind its alleged 
ultra vires transactions. 
~~- -~~ 
c. The University Requested, Initiated And 
Ratified The Acts Of Bosworth. The Uni-
versity Is Estopped From Seeking Relief 
From Bosworth. 
A stockbroker's customer is deemed to have ratified 
the acts of the broker, even if the acts were unauthorized, 
unless, after becoming aware of the material facts in con-
nection with the acts, the customer promptly repudiates the 
broker's conduct. Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U.S. 461 ( 1901). 
Once a customer ratifies his broker's acts, the customer is 
estopped from seeking liability against the broker. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bocock, 247 F.Supp. 373 
(S.D. Tex. 1965). 
The general issue of ratification and the more specific 
issue of whether an alleged repudiation was timely are ques-
tions of fact. Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 397 (189G). 
In this case, there is no dispute as to the following 
facts: 
1. The University first became aware of the 
question of the propriety of the investment program in 
December, 1972; 
2. As early as December, 1972, the University 
decided that it should generally cease buying and selling 
common stocks; 
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3. The University did not notify Bosworth until 
March, 1973, that Catron, who had been duly authorized by 
written resolution of the University to deal with Bosworth, 
was no longer authorized to buy stocks on behalf of the 
University; and 
4. The bulk of the University trades through 
Bosworth occurred between December, 1972, and March, 1973. 
Ratification by the University is raised by Bosworth 
as an affirmative defense (Bosworth's Answer, 12th Defense). 
The above facts and others in the case clearly frame the 
issues of ratification and estoppel. Genuine questions of 
fact are presented including (1) when did the Unviersity 
first become aware of the material facts in connection with 
the alleged impropriety of investing its funds in common 
stocks? (2) did the Unversity repudiate its trades made 
through Bosworth? (3) if the University repudiated its 
trades with Bosworth, was the repudiation timely? and, 
(4) by trading in the stock market through Bosworth after 
December, 1972, until March, 1973, did the University ratify 
the acts of Bosworth thereby estopping any claims of lia-
bility against Bosworth? 
Even assuming the University has stated a claim for 
relief against Bosworth (which Bosworth denies), these 
questions need to and must be answered by the trier of fact 
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at a trial. The lower court erred in granting partial 
summary judgment on liability. 
Furthermore, under traditional elements of estoppel, 
it is clear that this case presents, at the very least, a 
question of fact as to whether the University should be 
estopped to recover on the transactions in issue. 
This Court applied estoppel against a governmental 
entity in Wall v. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 593, 168 P. 766 
(1917). In doing so, this Court became one of the earliest 
to apply estoppel against a governmental body. In its 
opinion, this Court stated: 
[T]he municipality by its own affirmative acts, 
declarations, and conduct, misled the party, or 
induced him to believe that he had the right to 
rely upon the assurances which the municipality, 
after a long period of time, sought to repudiate 
to his injury. Id. 
In Tooele City v. Elkington, 100 Utah 485, 594, 116 P.2d 
406 (1941), this court expressly reaffirmed the principles 
of estoppel applied in Wall. 
Of course, not every representation by a government 
employee gives rise to a defense of estoppel. But where, as 
here, high-ranking public officials assure a private company, 
which relies on the assurances, estoppel should be applied to 
bar recovery. See Hackett v.City of Otawa, 99 U.S. 86 (1879). 
In Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41 (1951), the 
plaintiff (Moser) had relied on express written assurances 
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of a State Department officer that he (Moser) would not be 
barred from seeking American citizenship if he applied for 
an exemption from military service. In fact, however, a 
federal treaty provided that exemption from military service 
would bar citizenship. Hence, the department officer's 
assurances to Moser constituted an ultra vires promise to 
him. In allowing Moser to obtain citizenship despite the 
express provisions of the treaty, the United States Supreme 
Court explained: 
Petitioner had sought information and guidance 
from the highest authority to which he could turn. 
He was led to believe that he would not 
thereby lose his rights to citizenship. If he had 
known otherwise he would not have claimed exemp-
tion. In justifiable reliance on this advice he 
signed the papers sent to him by the Legation. 
In this case, Bosworth ~sked for and received from the 
University an express assurance of the propriety of the Uni-
versity's conduct before Bosworth agreed to open an account 
for the University. As was Moser, Bosworth was "lulled •• 
into misconception of the legal consequences" of its actions. 
Under such circumstances, the lower court should have held 
that the University is estopped, as a matter of law, from 
recovery. At the very least, the lower court should have 
allowed the question of estoppel to go to the trier of fact. 
Every element of estoppel, as applied against govern-
mental bodies in the aforementioned decisions and in many 
others, is present in this action: 
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1. The party to be estopped knew the facts. In 
this case, University officers and its Institutional Council 
were fully advised of the University's investment program, 
the kinds of stocks being purchased and sold, and the 
precise identity, cost and sales price of every stock 
actually purchased and sold; 
2. The University intended that its conduct 
would be acted upon. The University's corporate resolution 
was obviously designed to allow the University to open and 
maintain an account with Bosworth; 
3. The party raising estoppel was ignorant of 
the true facts; 
4. The party (Bosworth) seeking to invoke 
estoppel relied to its detriment on the University's conduct. 
The lower court erred in granting the University's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The University's case against 
Bosworth should have been dismissed as a matter of law 
because the University is estopped from seeking relief. 
In the alternative, there exist genuine material issues of 
fact with respect to the issue of estoppel to be resolved by 
a trier of fact at trial. 
D. The University Had Authority To Invest 
In Securities. 
The University's complaint asserts that the University 
did not have the power to enter orders with Bosworth for the 
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purchase of securities. As a matter of law the University 
had such power. The University has a traditional legislative 
general grant of authority to handle its finances. The Utah 
State Legislature has specifically granted the University 
power to invest in the securities at issue here. 
In 1888, the Territorial Assembly authorized the exis-
tence and operation of an agricultural college which later 
became known as Utah State University. (Chapter 2, Compiled 
Laws of Utah 1888, p. 663, §§1852-1857, 1862, 1868, 1870). 
In doing so, the Assembly provided for the Governor and 
Secretary of the Territory and five county assessors to be 
trustees of the college. Section 4 of the Act specified the 
powers of the trustees: 
Said trustees shall take charge of the general 
interest of the institutio~, and shall have power 
to enact by-laws and rules for the regulation of 
all of its concerns, not inconsistent with the 
laws of the territory. They shall have the 
general control and supervision of the agricul-
tural college, the farm pertaining thereto, and 
such lands that may be vested into the college 
by territorial legislation, of all appropriations 
made by the territory for the support of the same, 
and also of lands that may hereafter be donated 
by the territory, or the United States, or by 
any person or corporation, in trust for the pro-
motion of argicultural and industrial pursuits. 
(Emphasis added}. 
In 1892, the Territorial Assembly amended the Act of 
1888 and created a Board of Trustees to be appointed by the 
governor. The enumerated powers of the Board did not differ 
substantially from those of its predecessor, except that the 
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1892 amendment also empowered the Board "to exercise such 
other powers as might be incidental or necessary to carry 
out the express powers". Spence v. Utah State Agricultural 
College, 225 P.2d 18, 23 (Utah 1950). 
In 1896, the Utah State Constitution was enacted. 
Article x, Section 4 states: 
University and Agricultural College Located --
Rights and Immunities Confirmed. The location and 
establishment by existing laws of the University 
of Utah and the Agricultural College are hereby 
confirmed, and all of the rights, immunities, 
franchises and endowments heretofore granted or 
conferred, are hereby perpetuated unto said 
University and Agricultural College, respectively. 
This Constitutional provision perpetuated into Utah's 
law all "rights, immunities, franchises and endowments" 
enjoyed by the University under the enabling Act of 1888 
including, of course, the "general" power vested in the 
Board of Trustees to "control and supervise all appropri-
ations" of the University. 
In 1969, the Legislature enacted the "Higher Education 
Act of 1969" now Utah Code Ann. §53-48-1 - §53-48-25 (1953). 
This Act eliminated the Board of Trustees and the Coordinat-
ing Council and in their stead created a State Board of 
Higher Education in which was vested the "control, manage-
ment and supervision of Utah State University 
Utah Code Ann. §53-48-4 (1953). The Section added: 
Except as specifically provided by law, the Board 
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and responsibility heretofore held and exercised 
by the governing bodies of the aforementioned 
institutions and by the Coordinating Council of 
Higher Education. 
Thus, the Coordinating Council of Higher Education has 
the power, previously granted by the Board of Trustees, to 
have "general control and supervision of the college • 
of all appropriations made by the State of Utah • • • 
for the support of same." 
Throughout this legislative history, the legislature 
and the Utah Constitution have granted general authority to 
the University to handle its appropriations. 
There are also other specific legislative grants of 
power to the University which permit investments in the 
securities now under consideration. 
Utah Code Ann. §53-32-4 (1953) states: 
The Utah State Agricultural College in its cor-
porate capacity may take by purchase, grant, gift, 
devise or bequest any property real or personal 
for the use of any department of the college or 
for any purpose appropriate to the objects of the 
college. It may convert property received by 
gift, grant, devise or bequest and not suitable 
for uses into other property so available or into 
money. Such property so received or converted 
shall be held, invested and managed and the 
proceeds thereof used by the Board of Trustees for 
the purposes and under the conditions prescribed 
in the grant or donation." (Emphasis added). 
This section specifically allows the University to 
invest in any property, real or personal, received by 
purchase, grant, gift, devise or bequest. 
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Section 53-48-20 (3) of the Higher Education Act also 
authorized universities to accept contributions, grants or 
gifts from private corporations or persons in governmental 
agencies for certain research programs. It also authorized 
the universities to "retain, accumulate, invest, commit and 
expend funds and proceeds from authorized programs." 
Apparently the University's assertion that it did not 
have the power to invest in the securities listed is based 
upon Utah Code Ann. §33-1-1 (1953) which, by its own terms, 
merely supplements the powers of municipal bodies to invest 
in securities. Utah Code Ann. §33-1-3 (1953) states: 
The provisions of this Act are supplemental to 
any and all other laws relating to and declaring 
what shall be legal investment for the persons, 
corporation, organizations and officials referred 
to in this Act. 
Any reliance by the University on the common law 
Dillon's Rule in municipal law is also misplaced. Dillon's 
Rule states that a municipality only enjoys such powers as 
are expressly granted by constitutional or legislative 
provision. Even if Dillon's Rule applies to the University 
it in no respect means that the University has no power to 
invest in securities. The University has been given a 
general and specific grant of authority to so invest. 
Furthermore, Dillon's Rule has no application to the 
University because the University is not a municipality. 
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l 
See Condor v. University of Utah, 123 Utah 182, 257 P.2d 367 
( 1953}. 
Reading all of the laws together, the University's 
position that Utah Code Ann. §33-1-1 (1953) prohibits 
investments in common stock is without foundation. 
Bosworth recognizes that this Court held in First Equity 
v. Utah State University, 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975), that at 
least some of the University's funds could not be invested 
in common stocks. Bosworth asserts that this Court should 
now reconsider and overrule its decision in First Equity on 
the grounds set forth in this section of Bosworth's Brief. 
However, even if the court does not overrule its decision in 
First Equity, Bosworth is nevertheless entitled to the 
relief it seeks on appeal in this case on the basis of all 
other arguments asserted in this Brief. In First Equity, 
this Court held that a broker is not entitled to enforce an 
executory contract to purchase securities because the secu-
rities were outside the ambit of Utah Code Ann. §33-1-1 
(1953). In so holding, this Court simply applied the 
longstanding rule that parties to an illegal contract will 
be left where the court finds them. The holding in First 
Equity in no respect supports the University's position in 
this case that the securities transactions should be undone 
and that Bosworth, the agent-broker should be held liable 
-25-
j Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for any losses sustained by the University. 
E. The University's Claim Against Bosworth Is 
Barred By The Utah Uniform Fiduciaries Act. 
The Utah Uniform Fiduciaries Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§22-1-1 et. seq. (1953) precludes a finding of liability 
against Bosworth. Pursuant to the act, the University and 
Catron, as its agent, had authority to invest in securi-
ties. Utah Code Ann. §53-32-4 (1953) states: 
The Utah State Agricultural College ••• in 
its corporate capacity may take by purchase, 
grant, gift, devise or bequest any property real 
or personal for the use of any department of the 
college and for any purpose appropriate to the 
objects of the college. It may convert property 
received by gift, grant, devise or bequest and not 
suitable for its uses into other property so 
available or into money. Such property so re-
ceived or converted shall be held, invested and 
managed and the proceeds thereof used by the board 
of trustees for the purposes and under the condi-
tions described in the grant or donation. 
This section specifically allows the University to 
invest in any property, real or personal, received by 
purchase, grant, gift, devise or bequest. 
Similarly, the Higher Education Act of 1969, ch. 138 
§20(3), Utah Code Ann. §53-48-20(3) authorizes state uni-
versities to accept contributions, grants or gifts from 
private corporations or persons in governmental agencies 
for research programs and concomitantly, to "retain, accumu-
late, invest, commit and expend funds and proceeds from such 
authorized programs." 
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Under the Utah Uniform Fiduciaries Act, Catron, in 
dealing with Bosworth, was acting as a fiduciary. The act 
defines fidicuiary as follows: 
[A] Trustee, under any trust, expressed, implied, 
resulting or constructive, executor, administrator 
guardian, conservator, curator, receiver, trustee 
in banktuptcy, assignee for the benefit of credi-
tors, partner, agent, officer of a corporation, 
public or private, public officer and any other 
person acting in a fiduciary capacity for any 
person, trust or estate. Utah Code Ann. §22-1-1 
( 1953). 
Catron was clearly an "agent, officer of a corporation, 
public or private, or a public officer". 
Since Catron was a fiduciary, and since the University 
had the authority to invest part of its money in common 
stocks, the Utah Uniform Fiduciaries Act relieves Bosworth 
from inquiring as to whether the fiduciary had the power 
to invest all monies under his control if he had the power 
to invest any of them. The Act also provides that: 
If a check or other bill of exchange is drawn 
by a fiduciary as such, or in the name of its 
principal by a fiduciary empowered to draw 
such instrument in the name of its principal, 
the payee is not bound to inquire whether the 
fiduciary is committing a breach of his obli-
gations as a fiduciary in drawing or delivering 
the instrument, and is not chargeable with 
notice that the fiduciary is committing a 
breach of his obligation as fiduciary, unless 
he takes the instrument with actual knowledge 
of such breach or with knowledge of such facts 
of his action in taking the instrument amounts 
to bad faith. Utah Code Ann. §22-1-5 (1953). 
-27-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The depositions taken in this action to date show that 
neither the University nor Catron knew the specific source 
of the funds used for any individual common stock trans-
action. Part of the money came from grant, gift, devise, 
or bequest and from contributions, grants and gifts from 
private corporations which, clearly, the University had 
the power to invest in securities. (Catron 58). Therefore, 
pursuant to the Utah Uniform Fiduciaries Act, §22-1-5, 
Bosworth, as a matter of law, cannot be held liable to the 
University. The lower court should have dismissed this 
suit. 
F. The University May Not Recover From 
Bosworth Because Bosworth Reasonably 
And In Good Faith Changed Its Position 
In Reliance Upon The Regularity Of The 
Transactions At Issue. 
During a period covering several months, Bosworth acted 
as the University's broker-agent and negotiated numerous 
purchases and sales of securities on the University's behalf. 
For its services, Bosworth retained only its earned commis-
sions. By so acting on behalf of the University, Bosworth 
reasonably and in good faith changed its position in reliance 
on the regularity of the transactions engaged in by the 
University through Bosworth. Under such circumstances, the 
University should, in equity, be precluded from undoing those 
transactions. 
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In Maricopa County v. Cities and Towns, 467 P.2d 949 
(Ariz. 1970), a county sued to recover tax funds mistakenly 
disbursed to defendant cities and towns. The Arizona court 
recognized that the county had a legitimate claim for 
restitution, but denied recovery because (1) the defendants 
had no prior notice of the payments, (2) the funds had been 
spent, and (3) !aches. The court stated: 
No claimant, however, has an absolute right to 
restitution for an enriching benefit, mistakenly 
conferred. Comment C under §1 of the Restatement 
of Restitution states: "Even where a person has 
received benefit from another, he is liable to pay 
therefor only if the circumstances of its receipt 
or retention are such that, as between the two 
persons, it is unjust for him to retain it." 4687 
P.2d at 953. 
The reasoning and holding in Maricopa County are equal-
ly applicable here. An action for restitution (which the 
University seeks in this case) is necessarily based upon 
fundamental equitable principles. In equity, the Univer-
sity's claim for restitution against Bosworth cannot be 
sustained. 
G. The University's Claim Is Barred By The 
Equitable Doctrine Of Unclean Hands. 
The University, in asking for a rescission of the 
contracts, is seeking equitable relief. Equitable relief 
will not be given to a party whose ~njury or loss is due to 
his own wrongdoing. For the purposes of the University's 
-29-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Motion for Summary Judgment asserted below, it must be taken 
as true that the University affirmatively and wrongfully 
induced Bosworth to act to its detriment. It also must be 
taken as true that the University had knowledge that its 
authority to invest in common stocks out of public monies 
was in question in December, 1972, but that it failed to 
notify Bosworth of such question until March, 1973, during 
which period of time most of the University's transactions 
through Bosworth occurred. 
It also must be taken as true that Bosworth has neither 
committed a wrongful act nor breached any judicially recog-
nized duty to the University. Before these transactions 
were undertaken, the Institutional Council expressly warranted 
to Bosworth that the University had the capacity and authority 
to engage in the transactions. Bosworth, after taking great 
pains to inquire into the issues of capacity and authority 
by the University, reasonably assumed that those members of 
the Institutional Council charged by law with supervising 
the University investments would be familiar with limita-
tions, if any, on its investment powers and would not have 
authorized the transactions had there been any doubt as to 
their validity. 
Wall v. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 593, 168 P. 766 (1917) 
involved a municipality whic~ had, by its own affirmative 
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declarations, misled a third party and induced him to 
believe that an agent for the municipality was authorized. 
The court held that the third party had the right to rely 
upon those assurances which the municipality sought to 
repudiate: 
[T]he municipality, by its own affirmative 
acts, declarations, and conduct, misled the party, 
or induced him to believe that he had the right 
to rely upon the assurances which the municipality, 
after a long period of time, sought to repudiate 
to his injury. SO Utah at 601. 
Similarly, the Court in Marin v. Calmenson, 197 N.W. 
262, stated: 
No one should be permitted to plead his own wrong 
to relieve himself from the obligations of an 
executed contract, the benefits of which he re-
tains. The innocence or ignorance of the credi-
tor is not essential to his right to enforce the 
contract, because the principle of estoppel is 
not applied, but the fundamental principle that 
one who seeks equity must do equity and may not 
accept the benefits and repudiate the burdens of 
his contract. 
In this case, the University has not done equity and, 
therefor, may not turn to equity for relief. 
H. To Allow The University To Recover Would 
Be In Violation Of Bosworth's Constitu-
tional Right Of Due Process Of Law. 
To allow the University to recover against Bosworth 
un~er the circumstances of the present case would be contrary 
to fundamental notions of fairness and justice in violation 
of Bosworth's due process rights under both the Utah and 
United States Constitutions. 
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In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 607 (1947) the United 
States Supreme Court held that "fundamental notions of 
fairness and justice .•• lie embedded in the feelings of 
the American people and are enshrined in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment". Summarily, the United 
States Supreme Court stated the following in Malinkski v. 
New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1944): 
[J]udicial review of that guaranty of the Four-
teenth Amendment inescapably imposes upon the 
Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course 
of the proceedings in order to ascertain whether 
they offend those canons of decency and fairness 
which express the notions of justice of English-
speaking peoples. 324 U.S. at 417. 
There is a long tradition in the Courts of this country 
requiring legislation, both state and federal, to comport 
with "fundamantal notions of fairness and justice" contem-
plated by the Fourteenth Amendment. This requirement that 
legislation work a fair result has been recently applied in 
City of Edmund v. Wakefield, 537 P.2d 1211 (Okla. 1975): 
If the ordinance in question deprived no one of 
constitutionally protected procedural rights, 
then this Court must concern itself with the 
issues of the basic fairness and reasonableness 
of the ordinance. In essence, substantive due 
process of law, independently of any procedural 
rights guaranteed by constitutional provisions, 
is the general requirement that all governmental 
actions have a fair and reasonable impact on the 
life, liberty, or property of the person affected. 
537 P.2d at 1213. 
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It would be grossly unfair to hold Bosworth liable to the 
University in this case. Bosworth did everything reasonably 
within its power to determine the validity of its dealings 
with the University and was assured not only with oral 
representations that the University had the power to invest 
in securities, but also with a written corporate resolution 
to that effect. 
I. There Is A Question Of Fact As To Whether 
Plaintiff Suffered Any Loss. 
There is a genuine question of fact as to whether the 
University in fact suffered any loss resulting from its 
investments. The State of Utah by its Legislature reimbursed 
the University in the 1974 Budget Session for losses incurred 
from the University's securities transactions. See Supple-
mental Appropriations Act, Sen~te Bill No. 38, Laws of Utah, 
1974, Chap. 39, Sec. 1. If a party has suffered no loss in 
fact, he has no claim for relief. See Estate Counseling 
Services, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
303 F.2d 527, 533 (L.A. 10 1962); Chaney v. Western States 
Title Insurance Co., 292 F.Supp. 376 (D.C. Utah 1968); 
Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, et al., 357 F.Supp. 1331 (D.C. 
Ill. 1973). 
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POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
BOSWORTH'S THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS. 
A. Bosworth's Third-Party Complaint For 
Indemnity And Contribution Stated Claims 
Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted. 
Bosworth's Third-Party claims are directed against the 
University's officers and members of its Institutional Council 
and are based on theories of implied contract, warranty, implied 
warranty, misrepresentation, indemnity, subrogation and 
conduct outside the scope of authority. 
The court below granted the third-party defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. In so doing, the lower court held as 
a matter of law that under no conceivable state of facts 
could those persons who actively implemented and supervised 
the University's investment program be held liable to Bosworth. 
The lower court erred in dismissing Bosworth's third-
party claims. Bos~urLh's third-party action was based on 
express assurances to Bosworth from the third-party defendants 
that the University had the authority to invest in common 
securities. Under well-settled principles of law, those 
express assurances of capacity and authority gave rise to an 
implied contract to indemnify Bosworth from any loss it may 
suffer as a result of Bosworth's reasonable reliance on such 
assurances. 
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If Bosworth is only constructively at fault in this 
case, (i.e., if Bosworth is charged only with constructive 
notice of the illegality of the University's investment), 
then it is entitled to full indemnity for any of its losses 
as a result of reliance on representations by the Institu-
tional Council and other University officials. On the other 
hand, even if the court were to determine, at trial, that 
Bosworth is equally culpable with the Institutional Council 
members and other University officials, then at least 
Bosworth's third-party claims for contribution from those 
individuals constitute claims upon which relief can be 
granted under general principles of law applicable to joint 
wrongdoers. 
Bosworth is entitled to seek the relief sought by its 
third-party action because it fulfilled its duty of inquiry 
regarding the University's authority. This court held in 
First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah State University, 
544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975), that persons dealing with public 
officers have a duty to inquire into the limits of their 
authority. Under the circumstances of this case, there is 
no quesiton that Bosworth fulfilled such a duty. Bosworth 
did all that could possibly be expected to satisfy itself 
that the University had authority to deal in securities. 
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After having been approached by the University's agent, 
Catron, Bosworth went directly to the principal, the Univer-
sity's Institutional Council, and received written assur-
ances that the University had authority to deal in the 
stock market through Bosworth. Under these facts, pursuant 
to general principles of the law of warranty, those acting 
on behalf of the University in assuring Bosworth that the 
University had the capacity to deal and invest in securities 
are strictly liable to Bosworth if those assurances prove to 
be false. The purpose of the law of warranty is to relieve 
the one assured of his duty to inquire further into the 
facts for himself. Paccon, Inc. v. United States, 399 
F.2d 162 (Ct. of Cl. 1968); Hoover v. Nielson, 510 P.2d 760 
(Ariz. 1973); Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 
538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975). 
The law in Utah is that one only constructively liable 
to an injured party may recover either contribution, indem-
nity, or subrogation from the person primarily responsible. 
Holmstead v. Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc., 493 P.2d 625 (Utah 
1972) ["While the master may be jointly sued with the servant 
for a tort of the latter they are not joint tort-
feasors in the sense that they are equal wrongdoers without 
the right of contribution, for the master may recover from the 
servant the amount of loss caused to him by the tort, ••.. "] 
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Hoggan v. Cahoon, 73 P. 512 (Utah 1903); Culmer v. Wilson, 
44 P. 833 (Utah 1896). 
Under the circumstances of this case, Bosworth is clearly 
entitled to seek indemnity, contribution or subrogation from 
the third-party defendants. 
B. Bosworth's Third-Party Claims Are Not 
Barred By Sovereign Immunity. 
The court below granted third-party defendants' Motions 
to Dismiss Bosworth's third-party claims without setting forth 
any reasons for the dismissals in its Memorandum Decision. 
(R. 1775). 
The only clues provided by the lower court as to its 
reasons for dismissing the third-party action were two 
statements it made in the course of other rulings. At a 
hearing before the lower court on April 19, 1978, Judge 
Christofferson explained that his decision to grant the 
third-party defendants' Motions to Dismiss was based "pri-
marily on immunity". Tr. 68. And, the court also noted, in 
its final decision granting the University's motions for 
partial summary judgment, that: 
This Court feels that the brokers cannot escape 
liability for their illegal acts, acts with which 
they are charged legally with knowing to be 
illegal by saying officials of Utah State also 
knew this and were charged with this knowledge. 
The Court feels that where a governmental entity 
is involved and parties are charged with the 
illegal use of public funds that the other illegal 
party cannot escape liability by saying the 
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specific party we dealt with does not come into 
this matter with clean hands either. 
Thus, according to the lower court, if one "illegal 
party" is a governmental entity and the other "illegal party" 
is a private company, the private company is always strictly 
liable for any losses sustained by the government. Such a 
position is legally untenable. The third-party action 
should not have been dismissed. 
Bosworth's third-party claims are not barred by immu-
nity. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§68-30-3, et. seq. (1953), has no application to the 
third-party defendants. That Act applies only to "govern-
mental entities", not to employees of governmental entities. 
Recognizing this, the third-party defendants argued in the 
court below that they were entitled to common law "official 
immunity." T. 87. 
This court's holding and reasoning in Cornwall v. Larsen, 
571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977) are applicable in the present case. 
In Cornwall, the plaintiff was injured in a collision 
between the automobile in which he was riding and a vehicle 
operated by a deputy sheriff. Suit was brought against the 
county, the deputy sheriff and the sheriff. The trial 
court dismissed the suit as to all defendants, but this 
Court reversed the dismissal against the sheriff, the deputy 
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sheriff and other named individuals, ruling that a claim for 
relief had been made as to the individual defendants because 
of the plaintiff's assertions that (1) the employees in 
question were negligent, even though acting within the scope 
of their authority, and (2) the acts of the officer driving 
the emergency vehicle were wilful, unlawful and in excess of 
his authority. Id. at 927. This Court also expressly 
relied upon its earlier decision in Sheffield v. Turner, 21 
Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367 (1968). 
In Sheffield this court noted that immunity of an 
individual government employee is derivative of the immunity 
of the sovereign. Accordingly, because the officer sued in 
Sheffield was engaged in the exercise of a governmental 
(rather than proprietary) function of the sovereign, he was 
protected unless he was acting outside the scope of his 
authority. Id. at 316-317. 
The allegations of the third-party complaint filed by 
Bosworth meet the requirements for stating a claim for 
relief in accordance with Cornwall and Sheffield. Bosworth 
has alleged that the conduct of the University's officers 
wilfully exceeded the scope of their authority, that those 
officers were negligent in not ascertaining that the securi-
ties transactions in question might be ~ vires or 
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illegal, and that the officers knew, or should have known, 
of such illegality. Bosworth also states a claim for relief 
by alleging that the officers and Institutional Council 
members failed to notify Bosworth, at the earliest possible 
time, of the revocation of Catron's authority. 
Whenever a public officer exceeds his authority in 
carrying out either ministerial or discretionary duties, he 
may be held personally liable to a private party injured by 
his actions. Bosworth's third-party complaint stated claims 
against the Institutional Council members and other Univer-
sity officials for acts outside their statutory authority, 
the reasoning being that (1) if the University is entitled 
to recover from Bosworth, it will do so on the sole basis 
that the securities transactions were ultra vires, i.e., not 
authorized by statute, and (2) if the University lacks statu-
tory capacity to engage in securities transaction, (3) then 
the Institutional Council members and other University 
officials similarly lack statutory authority to open an 
account with Bosworth to deal in securities or to issue a 
corporate resolution that the University has such authority. 
Thus, the acts of the Institutional Council members and other 
University officials are not protected by common law official 
immunity. 
authority. 
Said persons clearly exceeded their statutory 
Logan City v. Allen, 86 Utah 375, 44 P.2d 1085 
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(1935); Blonquist v. Summit County, 25 Utah 2d 387, 483 P.2d 
430 (1971); and Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 527, 57 P.2d 
1128 (1936) [no public officer may "claim immunity for the 
commission of an act entirely outside the scope of his 
official duties"]. 
Furthermore, to the extent the immunity of the Institu-
tional Council members and other University officers is 
derivative of the immunity of the University, immunity as to 
those persons is not proper because the acts here sued upon 
clearly involved proprietary and not governmental functions 
of the University. See, e.g., Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 
530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975) ["It is therefore our conclusion 
that proprietary functions of a municipality are not within 
the coverage of the Utah Governmental Act"]. The conduct 
here at issue is clearly proprietary because the sole 
purpose of the University's investment program was to make 
money by competing with private investors in commercial 
securities markets. See Greenhalgh, supra. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING BOSWORTH'S 
MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE. 
Bosworth's principal place of business is in Colorado. 
At all times material to this case, it has maintained only 
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one branch office in Utah, located in Salt Lake County. The 
University is located in Logan, Cache County, Utah. 
No significant acts in connection with the various 
transactions between the University and Bosworth were 
performed in Cache County. (R. 94, 95 and 136). 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-13-8 (1953), Bosworth 
moved the lower court for a change of venue to Salt Lake 
County pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-13-9(1) (1953) which 
allows the court to change the place of trial "when the 
county designated in the Complaint is not the proper county". 
The grounds of the motion were that Bosworth resides in 
Salt Lake County and that the contracts complained of, if 
performed in Utah, were performed in Salt Lake County. 
The Motion for Change of Venue was denied by the lower 
court holding Bosworth subject to trial in Cache County on 
the ground that Cache County was the residence of the 
University. 
The University alleges in its First Amended Complaint 
that Utah Code Ann. §8-13-7 (1953) is controlling in this 
case. Bosworth, in support of its Motion for Change of 
Venue (R. 138-146), contends that Utah Code Ann. §78-13-4 
(1953) is the controlling statute if the University's 
allegations establish a cause of action based upon a con-
tract. 
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Regardless of which statute controls, however, the only 
proper county in which suit may be brought is Salt Lake 
County. Venue in Cache County is improper. 
A. Venue Is Improper In Cache County Under Utah 
Code Ann. §78-13-7 (1953). 
Section 78-13-7 (1953) states: 
In all other cases the actions must be 
tried in the county in which the cause of action 
arises, or in the county in which any defendant 
resides at the commencement of the action; pro-
vided that if any such defendant is a corporation, 
any county in which such corporation has its 
principal off ice or place of business shall be 
deemed the county in which such corporation 
resides within the meaning of this section. If 
none of the defendants resides in this state, 
such action may be commenced and tried in any 
county of which the plaintiff may designate in his 
complaint; and if the defendant is about to depart 
from the state, such action may be tried in any 
county where any of the parties resides or service 
is had, subject, however, to the power of the 
court to change the 'place of trial as provided by 
law. 
As applied to this case, §78-13-7 requires that the 
action be tried (1) in the county where the action arises or 
(2) where the defendant resides. 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined a "cause of action" 
as "either the violation of a legal obligation or the 
omission to perform a duty imposed by law of the condition 
of a wrong by a person which results in injury to another, 
and of either the actual damage, or the damage implied by 
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law caused thereby." Fields v. Daisy Gold Mining Co., 73 P. 
521 (Utah 1903). 
The gist of the University's cause of action, if any, 
is that Catron exceeded his authority in purchasing and 
selling speculative stock on behalf of the University, that 
the University itself had no power to authorize the purchase 
or sale of such stock, that Bosworth was allegedly aware of 
the limitations of authority and power, and that the Uni-
versity suffered damages caused thereby. 
Such a cause of action arose, if at all, in Salt 
Lake County, not in Cache County. 
(1) The University's securities trading account with 
Bosworth was opened in Bosworth's Salt Lake County office; 
(2) All orders for the purchase or sale of securities 
were entered by the University at Bosworth's Salt Lake 
County office and were accepted, transmitted and confirmed 
by Bosworth at or from its Salt Lake County office; 
(3) All new account documents and authorizations by 
the University were submitted to Bosworth's Salt Lake County 
office. (R. 94, 95). 
Hence, the facts of the record below affirmatively show 
that the cause of action, if any, arose in Salt Lake County 
and that Salt Lake County is the "residence" of Bosworth. 
Salt Lake County is the only proper venue under Utah Code 
Ann. §78-13-7 (1953). 
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B. Venue Is Improper In Cache County Under Utah 
Code Ann. §78 13 4 (1953). 
Section 78-13-4 pertains to actions on written 
contracts: 
When the defendant has contracted in writing to 
perform an obligation in a particular county of 
the state and resides in another county, an action 
on such contract obligation may be commenced and 
tried in the county where such obligation is to be 
performed or in which the defendant resides. 
If this case is deemed to be one strictly in contract, 
then §78-13-4 would be applicable and venue would be proper 
only in the place where the contract was to be performed, 
which place of performance was Salt Lake County, or in the 
county in which Bosworth resides, also Salt Lake County. 
Virtually all of the various transactions between the 
University and Bosworth which were contemplated by and arose 
out of the original written brokerage agreement were Salt 
Lake County based. All orders for the purchase or sale of 
stock on behalf of the University were placed either in 
person or by telephone to Bosworth's place of business in 
Salt Lake County. (R.95, 136). 
Bosworth's only place of business in Utah was in Salt 
Lake County. (R.94). 
Furthermore, if each individual transaction entered 
into subsequent to the initial written brokerage agreement 
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between the University and Bosworth are considered, then 
contracts not in writing serve as the focal point of venue. 
In discussing the issue of venue in actions on contracts not 
in writing, the Utah Supreme Court in Buckle v. Ogden 
Furniture and Carpet Co., 216 P. 684 (Utah 1923) interpreted 
the predecessor to §78-13-4 and stated: 
Section 6528 relates to actions upon contracts 
only, and, if it means anything at all, it means 
that, when a defendant has contracted in writing 
to perform an obligation in a particular county, 
and resides in another county, the action may be 
tried in the former county and by plain implica-
tion, and the maxim, "expressio unius est excousio 
alterius," it means that actions on contracts not 
in writing are excluded, and are not authorized to 
be tried out of the county where the defendant 
resides." 216 P. at 686. (Emphasis added). 
Thus, whether the contract is deemed written or oral 
under §78-13-4, the only proper venue for this case is in 
Salt Lake County. 
Under any of the venue provisions which may be ap-
plicable in this case, Cache County is not a proper place 
for trial. The lower court's order denying Bosworth's 
Motion for Change of Venue was clearly in error and should 
be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The University's position in this case is wholly 
unsupportable, both in law and in fact. Bosworth acted 
reasonably and in good faith upon official authorization 
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from the University to act as the University's agent. To 
now attempt, as the University is doing in this case, to 
hold Bosworth liable to the University for the University's 
alleged losses sustained as a result of its activities in 
the stock market is repugnant not only to Bosworth's Con-
stitutional rights, but also to basic notions of fairness 
and justice. The lower court clearly erred in denying 
Bosworth's motion to dismiss this action. 
The lower court further erred in holding Bosworth 
liable as a matter of law, in refusing to allow Bosworth's 
third-party claims against the very individuals upon whose 
assurances Bosworth reasonably relied, and in denying 
Bosworth's Motion for Change of Venue. 
Accordingly, Boswor~h respectfully requests this Court 
to reverse the ruling of the court below, directing the 
lower court to enter judgment in favor of Bosworth on its 
motion to dismiss. 
In the alternative, Bosworth requests the court to 
reverse the rulings of the Court below in granting the Univer-
sity's Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing Bosworth's 
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Third-Party Complaint against the individual defendants and 
in denying Bosworth's Motion for Change of Venue. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Harold G. Christensen 
R. Brent Stephens 
Dee V. Benson 
Attorneys for Appellant Bosworth, 
Sullivan and Company 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
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